Democratic decentralization and local development: insights from Morocco’s advanced regionalization process by Bergh, S.I. (Sylvia)
482
26. Democratic decentralization and local 
development: insights from Morocco’s 
advanced regionalization process
Sylvia I. Bergh
1 INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALIZATION: 
DEFINITIONS, DRIVERS, PROMISES AND RISKS
1.1 Chapter Outline
Decentralization reforms have been undertaken around the world for about 45 years now, 
generating a significant body of literature. In this chapter, I will review a part of this literature 
and present some findings on the case of recent decentralization reforms at the regional level in 
Morocco. The chapter will emphasize the political economy drivers of decentralization reforms 
as the main explanations for the inconclusive evidence when it comes to local development.
The chapter is structured as follows. This first section reviews the main definitions, 
typologies, drivers, promises and risk. The second section conceptualizes the links between 
decentralization and local development. The third section introduces the Moroccan case and 
reviews the main characteristics in terms of governance, finance and regional planning. It also 
highlights the relationship between decentralization and deconcentration reforms there and 
argues that the latter significantly constrains the former’s potential to make a positive impact 
in terms of local development. The fourth section concludes.
1.2 Definition and Typology
A short definition of decentralization is provided by Faguet and Pöschl (2015, p. 2; citing 
Faguet and Sánchez, 2013 and Manor, 1999): ‘the devolution by central (i.e. national) govern-
ment of specific functions – with all of the administrative, political, and economic attributes 
that these entail – to regional and local (i.e. state/provincial and municipal) governments that 
are independent of the centre within given geographic and functional domains’.
Devolution is also known as ‘political’ or ‘democratic’ decentralization. This is because 
devolution usually transfers responsibilities for services to municipalities that elect their 
own mayors and councils, raise their own revenues, and have independent authority to make 
investment decisions (Litvack, Junaid and Bird, 1998, p. 6). Traditionally, the literature dis-
tinguishes between two additional forms of decentralization: deconcentration and delegation 
(Parker, 1995, pp. 19ff; Rondinelli, 1999, p. 2). Deconcentration is the process by which 
the central government disperses responsibilities for certain services to its regional branch 
offices without involving any transfer of authority to lower levels of government (Litvack 
et al., 1998, p. 4). This is often considered the weakest form of decentralization (Rondinelli, 
1999, p. 2). Delegation refers to a situation in which the central government transfers respon-
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sibility for decision making and administration of public functions to local governments or to 
semi-autonomous organizations that are not wholly controlled by the central government but 
are ultimately accountable to it (Litvack et al., 1998, pp. 4–6).
Although it could be considered a dimension of ‘political decentralization’, fiscal decen-
tralization is often mentioned in the literature as a separate form. It refers to ‘the set of 
rules that defines roles and responsibilities among different levels of governments for fiscal 
functions including planning and budget preparation, budget execution, revenue generation, 
the intergovernmental allocation of budgetary resources, and public sector borrowing’ (Boex 
and Yilmaz 2010, p. 4).1 It is clear that if local governments are denied the tax-raising powers 
and intergovernmental transfers needed to make real use of their political and administrative 
authority and autonomy, then decentralization is likely to be ineffective (ibid., p. 4).
1.3 Drivers of Decentralization Reforms
When it comes to the drivers for democratic decentralization reforms, we can distinguish two 
main currents in the literature. Some studies highlight ‘good governance’ arguments, while 
others emphasize political motives. A good example of the first current is Faguet (2014, p. 2) 
who writes:
At least in their intention, many decentralizations aim to reconstitute government – from a hierar-
chical, bureaucratic mechanism of top-down management to a system of nested self-governments 
characterized by participation and cooperation, where transparency is high and accountability to the 
governed acts as a binding constraint on public servants’ behaviour.
Indeed, decentralization reforms constitute a key pillar of the ‘good governance’ agenda 
promoted by neo-liberal public choice advocates and international donors such as the World 
Bank since the late 1980s, following the widespread disillusion with centralized and top-down 
development planning (Bergh, 2017, pp. 2–3).
However, it is now becoming evident that the lofty ambitions pronounced by national gov-
ernments in official discourses often hide the underlying political motivations. The country 
studies in Faguet and Pöschl’s (2015) edited volume (including Bolivia, India, Pakistan, 
Philippines, China, and many more) show that ‘decentralization reforms are largely driven 
by motivations of political survival and consolidation of power’ (Faguet and Pöschl, 2015, 
p. 3). This confirms the earlier findings by several other scholars, including Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2006, p. 32). Based on the in-depth study of decentralization reforms in eight 
countries from three different continents, Bardhan and Mookherjee (ibid.) found that in six 
out of the eight cases, the dominant motive was the challenge to the incumbent at the national 
level posed by competing political forces or regional interests. In other words, both in democ-
racies as well as in non-democracies, ‘decentralization was a concession to regional interests 
or an instrument for securing legitimacy of the national government or for quelling separatist 
tendencies’ (ibid.). A secondary reason for decentralization reform was that it accompanied 
a transition in the national political system, either toward democracy or non-democracy. 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (ibid.) also found that only in the case of Brazil and South Africa 
did external crises, pressure from multilateral institutions, or ideological considerations play 
any role.2
The variations in political context, the exact nature of the political challenges faced by gov-
ernment or political leaders in power, as well as the multiple resistances by other stakeholders 
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explain the wide range in the design, nature, and extent of decentralization reforms that could 
be either ‘comprehensive or piecemeal, uniform or uneven throughout different regions of the 
country, and gradual evolution or big-bang reform’ (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006, p. 32).
Indeed, the political motives behind decentralization reforms mean that they are often not 
implemented as promised, or as laid down in the policy and legal framework. Faguet and 
Pöschl (2015, p. 4) thus argue that ‘partial and “cynical” decentralizations are widespread 
in which, for instance, spending responsibilities are devolved without decision-making 
autonomy, or opposition forces are merely divided into various powerless entities to facilitate 
continued rule by the centre’. The half-hearted decentralization of powers thus often results in 
structures which may ‘diverge widely from the original plan, let alone any theoretical ideal’ 
(ibid., p. 8). This insight builds on Rondinelli, Cheema and Nellis (1983) and similar studies 
(e.g., Devarajan, Khemani and Shah, 2009; Dickovich and Wunsch, 2014) that found that 
elaborate mechanisms of central supervision and control have largely neutralized decentrali-
zation (Faguet, 2014 p. 5; see also Falleti, 2005). Faguet and Pöschl (2015, p. 3) thus conclude 
that ‘decentralization may fail to enhance development because it never actually happens’.
Here, the idea of ‘decision space’, or local government policy discretion, is a useful tool for 
researchers to assess whether and to what extent this is the case. First coined by Bossert in a 
1998 article, ‘decision space’ refers to the ‘local discretion allowed by central government for 
functions and sub-functions about financing, service delivery, human resources, and govern-
ance’ (Faguet and Pöschl, 2015, p. 8). This means that some decentralized systems will allow 
more choice (local discretion) over budgets and financing, while others will allow more such 
choice over hiring and firing (Bossert, 2015, p. 278). The level of discretion might, of course, 
also change over time. In addition, the actual practice of local officials is often not defined 
by the formal legal and regulatory rules, but rather reflects their ‘informal decision space’ in 
which they sometimes do not take advantage of the full range of choice or make more choices 
than they are ‘allowed’. Measuring this decision space can thus help to give a more nuanced 
(and dynamic) view of the real extent of decentralization reforms along sectoral and func-
tional parameters, and therefore give a more realistic idea about what developmental impacts 
to expect from decentralization reforms. For example, for the health sector in three Latin 
American countries, Bossert finds clear evidence that decentralization has led to increased 
equity of allocations between richer and poorer municipalities (Bossert, 2015, pp. 280–82; 
Faguet and Pöschl, 2015, p. 12).
1.4 The Promises of Decentralization Reforms
Despite the considerable evidence that decentralization reforms might not actually be imple-
mented to enhance development, but rather to help political leaders stay in power, let us briefly 
consider the main promises of such reforms at the theoretical level, as they are often invoked 
by these same leaders, and international donors promoting them.
As indicated in the quote from Faguet (2014) above, there are several ‘good governance’ 
outcomes expected to come from decentralization reforms, which are then thought to have 
a positive impact on socio-economic development as well as more transformative understand-
ings of development, that is, in terms of empowering individuals and communities. First, by 
bringing government closer to the people, the loop of accountability is tightened between those 
who produce public goods and services and those who consume them (Faguet, 2014, p. 5). 
According to Faguet (ibid., p. 11), decentralization reorients accountability incentives down-
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ward to voters because more public officials become beholden to more citizens. This includes 
allowing larger access to decision making for marginalized groups. Other political benefits 
of decentralization include the idea that elected local governments lead to increased levels 
of political competition in the country and provide alternative local routes to enter national 
politics. Finally, giving more autonomy to, for example, ethnic minorities means that political 
stability and national unity could be strengthened by appeasing fractious groups.
The fiscal federalism literature presents another set of expected benefits of decentralization 
reforms (see Boadway and Dougherty, 2018, pp. 6ff; World Bank, 2017, pp. 217ff). Since 
they are supposedly more aware of local conditions, local governments are expected to be 
more responsive to people’s conditions, needs and available assets than central governments, 
and their interventions can be more flexible and innovative, and better targeted. In general, 
decentralization reforms are expected to enable the state machinery to reach a larger number 
of people with services and ensure potentially better fee payment, in turn reducing costs. They 
might also reduce administrative pressure on central bureaucracies and abuses of power. Last, 
local government may play an ‘enabling’ or facilitating role as regards other stakeholders such 
as the private sector and civil society organizations, to whom it can contract out the delivery of 
certain public services and who might provide them more efficiently.
Have the reforms delivered on these promises? What emerges from four decades of research 
is that ‘decentralization both improves and worsens all of the promised outcomes, in different 
countries at different times, leaving us unable to draw broader conclusions’ (Faguet, 2014, 
p. 10; see also Ahmad and Brosio, 2009, pp. 138ff; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006, p. 48; 
Local Development International, 2013; for a good overview of the existing empirical litera-
ture, see Rao, Scott and Alam, 2014).
1.5 The Risks of Decentralization Reforms
Indeed, along with some success stories, there is also a growing literature that points to 
the risks or negative effects of decentralization reforms (see Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee, 2006; Boadway and Dougherty, 2018, p. 6; Crook and Manor, 1998; Faguet, 
2014; Grindle, 2007; Rondinelli and Cheema, 2007; Smoke, 2001; Olowu and Wunsch, 2003).
For example, decentralized service provision is not always efficient for standardized, 
routine, network-based services. This has to do with the loss of economies of scale (e.g., pre-
venting large-scale procurement). Most importantly, weak local capacity (in terms of human 
resources and institutions) may result in less effective and poor service delivery and/or policy 
making than under centralized provision. As mentioned above, reforms are often designed 
in such a way that the local government faces ‘unfunded mandates’, that is, the expenditure 
responsibilities of local governments are not matched by revenues devolved.
In federal systems, national coordination might become more complex, leading to increased 
regional disparity and growing apart. Indeed, decentralization reforms might institutionalize 
social or ethnic cleavages, and provide power and resource bases for separatist leaders, espe-
cially those in larger and wealthier provinces.
Finally, it may be difficult to enforce unpopular local policy such as tax collection (as face-to 
face contacts prevail in smaller communities), and functions and funds may be captured by 
local elites. Corruption and political violence may thus also be decentralized and multiply 
(Fjeldstad, 2004, cited in Clark, 2018, p. 25; Prud’homme, 1995; see also Boko and McNeil, 
2010). For example, in Indonesia, decentralization has offered regional elites new opportuni-
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ties to expand and maintain patrimonial political networks (Hadiz, 2004; Schulte Nordholt, 
2004, cited in Harriss, Stokke and Törnquist, 2004, p. 22; see also Murshed, Tadjoeddin and 
Chowdhury, 2009).
2 CONCEPTUALIZING THE LINKS BETWEEN 
DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT: 
SKETCHING A RESEARCH AGENDA
Despite these risks, Faguet and Pöschl (2015, p. 4) argue that decentralization can enhance 
(local) development in four ways, all of which deserve to be researched in more detail. First, 
decentralization can improve governance, mainly by enabling greater accountability of public 
officials to citizens, as well as more efficient or more responsive government outputs and 
outcomes due to being better informed about local needs (ibid., p. 11). Second, decentraliza-
tion can enhance development by creating competition among subnational governments. By 
publishing standardized, comparable information on the performance of all local governments, 
voters can assess and compare their own local government. This increases electoral pressures, 
which may make local officials responsive to constituents’ needs. Faguet and Pöschl (ibid., 
pp. 14–16) present evidence from China and the Philippines that such competition can indeed 
have positive effects.
Third, decentralization can enhance development by reducing clientelism. Findings from 
West Bengal seem at first glance to indicate the opposite – namely, that ‘in the short term, 
clientelistic appeals based on targeted benefits are electorally more effective than universal-
istic, long-term development investments and policies’ (ibid., p. 17). However, there is also 
evidence that in the long term, improved education and health (which presumably comes about 
through decentralized service provision) will tend to undermine a clientelistic party’s electoral 
support (ibid.).
Fourth, decentralization may lead to development through strengthening the state and 
national unity. Decentralization can strengthen the state in various ways: by limiting central 
leaders’ authority and autonomy in the interests of increasing the institutional strength of 
the state as a whole; through the extension of the state’s presence into remote areas (thus 
improving the perception of state responsiveness and enhancing the legitimacy of national 
governments); by strengthening political parties and the party system; over the longer term, 
through ‘social learning’, that is, the collective acquisition of knowledge, norms and practices, 
and trust among citizens living in the same place or interested in the same issues through inter-
actions with local government. Decentralization can thus make the state more ‘democratically 
supple’ by providing strong incentives for group formation, leading to more state–society 
interactions and ultimately more state legitimacy (see Faguet and Pöschl, 2015, pp. 19–21 and 
26–7 for details).
However, while these pathways may be quite convincing in theory, the evidence is rather 
sobering. In his review of decentralization reforms in ten African countries along four dimen-
sions, Wunsch (2014, p. 2) concludes that the decentralization of legal authority to subnational 
governments and deconcentrated offices has been achieved in many cases. However, on the 
autonomy dimension (i.e., the extent to which subnational governments ‘may undertake 
actions without the permission of other levels of government’; ibid., p. 10), the record is less 
convincing, as state authorities and dominant political parties exercise considerable control. 
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Similarly, despite local elections being held everywhere, accountability is mostly still upwards 
to actors at the centre, and capacity (resources and skills) remains a challenge. Based on these 
findings, Wunsch (ibid., p. 2) argues that ‘decentralization in many countries in Africa exhibits 
a paradox: it can actually strengthen or entrench national-level actors, even as it changes little 
in governance at the local level’. Or in other words, ‘decentralization appears to have changed 
the structure of government more than the quality of governance’ (Dickovick and Beatty 
Riedl, 2014, p. 249; original emphasis).
Aalen and Muriaas (2018, cited in Demmelhuber, Strum and Vollmann, 2020) focused 
on four African case studies (Ethiopia, Malawi, Uganda and South Africa) and found that 
ruling regimes can actively manipulate decentralization both by institutional design (such 
as creating overlapping responsibilities; see Ahmad and Brosio, 2009, p. 136) and the man-
agement of elites and opposition. It is thus mostly the interests and influences of state-based 
and state-focused actors that drive decentralization reform pathways, rather than the reform’s 
effectiveness as a tool for development or democracy. This is also due to the relative weak-
ness of independent private economic actors and civil society in many developing countries 
(Wunsch, 2014, p. 16).
Methodologically, the literature on decentralization reforms and their impacts has evolved 
over the last 30 or 40 years from consisting predominantly of country-level qualitative case 
studies by political scientists and anthropologists to econometric modelling by economists and 
policy analysts. However, as Faguet and Pöschl (2015, p. 2) argue, this ‘laudable quest for 
rigor leads technical studies to abstract away from the “details” of how policy reform actually 
works’. The inability to draw broader conclusions on the causal linkages between decentral-
ization and (local) development also has to do with the lack of analytical studies based on 
household survey data. As Bardhan (2002, p. 200) concludes, ‘many of the studies are largely 
descriptive…and often suggest correlations rather than causal processes. Most of them are 
not based on household survey data, making the comparative impact of centralized versus 
decentralized programs on different socioeconomic groups of households difficult to assess’. 
Fortunately, there is also an emerging literature in which a deep knowledge of the institutions, 
history and culture of a country is brought to bear on both qualitative analyses at the level of 
a municipality or province combined with large-N econometric methods (Faguet, 2014, p. 9). 
In what follows, I aim to contribute a qualitative case study on regional decentralization in 
Morocco.
3 A CASE STUDY ON ‘ADVANCED REGIONALIZATION’ IN 
MOROCCO3
3.1 Introduction
Although Morocco has a long history of decentralization at the municipal (and provincial) 
level dating back to 1960, I focus here on the current decentralization reform at the regional 
level (the so-called ‘advanced regionalization’ reform), as it illustrates very well the impor-
tance of understanding the political economy of decentralization and its influence on the 
design of decentralization reforms, before considering its (potential or real) developmental 
impacts (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006, pp. 10, 14; see also Eaton, Kaiser and Smoke, 2011 
and Local Development International, 2013). The 2011 reform reduced the number of regions 
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in Morocco from 16 to 12 and established directly elected regional assemblies to replace 
the previously indirectly elected ones, thereby creating a new political arena over which the 
various actors fight for influence. As opposed to the municipalities (whose competencies are 
limited to ‘mundane’ municipal services such as garbage collection), the regions now hold 
vast developmental responsibilities, which makes them a pertinent unit of analysis for this 
chapter (see Section 3.3 for more details). By choosing the case of Morocco, I also aim to fill 
a gap in the literature on decentralization that seems to consistently leave out North African 
countries in studies on decentralization in Africa (see, for example, Dickovick and Wunsch, 
2014) despite many similarities, not least a shared colonial history.
The main features of the ‘advanced regionalization’ reform can be categorized into three 
areas: governance issues, finance and regional planning (see Bergh, 2016), which will be 
discussed in the following subsections. The case study will end with a discussion on the rela-
tionship between decentralization and deconcentration reforms in Morocco. The latter reform 
– currently ongoing as well – arguably determines the ‘advanced regionalization’ reform’s 
potential impact in terms of local development to a great extent. First, however, it is useful to 
give a short introduction to the background of the reform.
3.2 Background
Despite historically being the most centralized states in the world, debates on decentralization 
processes took place since the early 1990s in almost all states of the Middle East and North 
Africa region (Demmelhuber et al., 2020). In the wake of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’, decen-
tralization reforms have gained momentum in the region (see Harb and Atallah, 2014). For 
example, based on its 2014 constitution, Tunisia held its first free local elections in May 2018. 
As Kherigi (2017, p. 5) points out, ‘the Arab Spring was partially a desperate cry for help by 
marginalized groups and regions against highly centralized political and economic systems in 
which all power is concentrated in a few hands at the centre’.
Like other countries in North Africa, Morocco suffers from marked spatial inequality:4 
According to the OECD (2018a, pp. 5, 22), 60 per cent of its 34 million inhabitants live in 
urban areas that generate 75 per cent of the national gross domestic product (GDP). The city 
of Casablanca alone, with 5 million inhabitants, contributes up to 29 per cent to the national 
GDP. Rural areas, in contrast, tend to suffer from higher poverty levels, weak education and 
health indicators, lack of basic infrastructure, and continue to remain focused on agriculture, 
which is the sole job-providing sector in many rural regions (accounting for 80 per cent of 
rural employment). Under- and unemployment explain the large rural exodus and the growth 
of slums in urban areas. Social protests for better service delivery in marginalized areas have 
been occurring for decades, and these protests reached the major cities in February 2011, when 
young graduates and middle-class activists but also Islamists added political demands to the 
socio-economic ones (see Bergh and Rossi Doria, 2015).
It was thus no surprise that the king of Morocco (King Mohammed VI), in order to defuse 
the tensions, framed the 2011 constitutional reform mainly around decentralization reform, 
called ‘advanced regionalization’, enshrining the principles of administrative autonomy of 
local governments (libre administration des collectivités locales), and subsidiarity (Chapter 9, 
Articles 135–146; Royaume du Maroc, 2011). This reform had been on the domestic agenda 
before Morocco’s Arab Spring, as the Consultative Regionalization Committee (Commission 
Consultative de la Régionalisation – CCR) was appointed by the king in January 2010, but 
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Table 26.1 The regionalization process in Morocco
Local Development
Phase I 1971 Creation of region without decision-making power
1976 Municipal charter, framework for local authorities
1992 Regions given local government status
Limited Regionalization
Phase II 1996 Creation of regions with limited powers
2001 Launch of programmes to promote regional development
2002 Local authorities become centres for economic growth
2004 First session of the Higher Council for Spatial Planning
2006 Specific credit line in the national budget
Advanced Regionalization
Phase III 2010 Consultative Regionalization Committee
2011 Regionalization added to the constitution (Article 1)
Regional Land Use Planning Schemes added to the constitution
2015 Election of regional presidents, powers transferred and own budget 
allocated
2015 Establishment of the fund for regions and the fund for interregional 
solidarity
2016 until today Adoption of 70 administrative legal texts to implement the reform
Source: Adapted from OECD (2018a, p. 13) by Francesco Colin.
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its recommendations came out in early 2011 (CCR, 2011), coinciding with popular protests. 
Many of the recommendations were integrated into the text of the new constitution. However, 
it took until July 2015 before the new organic laws on the region, province and commune 
(municipality) were passed by parliament and published in the Bulletin Officiel, and their 
official French translation was delayed until February 2016 (Hoffmann, 2015, p. 5).
Table 26.1 gives a snapshot of the key milestones in the Moroccan history of decentraliza-
tion, with a focus on the regional level (for details of municipal decentralization reforms since 
1960, see Bergh, 2017 and Clark, 2018).
Broadly, the ‘advanced regionalization’ system still retains some of the centralized features 
of the state that were inherited from the French protectorate but seems to have been inspired 
also by the Italian, German and Spanish models, and the global trends towards decentralization 
and participatory local democracy more generally. With regard to the underlying rationale, it 
is clear the Moroccan reforms did not result from a popular demand for regional autonomy 
based on regional identity (except perhaps for Berbers in the North), but rather from the need 
to give the same offer of autonomy to all regions as for the Western Sahara, and also in order to 
strengthen the Moroccan position in the international negotiations on this issue. Getting exter-
nal support for the recognition of Morocco’s claim on the territory of the Western Sahara has 
historically been seen as crucial to regime legitimacy and even survival (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
2009, p. 19; Bouabid and Iraki 2015; Ojeda García and Suárez Collado, 2015; Ottaway, 
2013; Reifeld, 2014, p. 104; Suárez Collado and Ojeda García, 2015; Willis 2009, p. 233; see 
Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental [CESE], 2016, p. 60 on the development plan 
for the so-called ‘Southern Provinces’).
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3.3 Governance Issues in the ‘Advanced Regionalization’ Reform
As for the governance features, the reform included the reduction in the number of regions 
from 16 to 12, with directly elected regional assemblies replacing previously indirectly elected 
ones. The regions’ own competencies were substantially expanded to include economic 
development, vocational training and employment, non-farming rural development, regional 
transport, culture, environment, spatial planning and development, and partnerships. Shared 
and transferable competencies have also been expanded and clarified, although the principle 
of subsidiarity mentioned in the 2011 constitution has not been applied by the organic laws. 
The exact transfer of sector-specific competencies is still being discussed between the regional 
assembly presidents and the Ministry of the Interior and is expected to be implemented from 
2019 onwards through contracts with the state (sectoral ministries), enabling differentiation 
between the regions based on their priorities and capacity (Gattioui, 2018). The regional wali 
(the governors of the administrative divisions [wilaya] appointed by the king and representing 
the Ministry of the Interior) no longer holds budget spending powers as before. These are now 
held by the (elected) president of the regional assembly. However, many observers believe 
that the wali nevertheless continues to be the focal point for all investment and development 
policies (Houdret and Harnisch, 2019). Indeed, the Ministry of the Interior (represented by the 
wali) still holds considerable powers of tutelle, that is, supervision/approval rights, including 
on all budget and spending decisions by the regional council (Article 116 in the 2015 Organic 
Law on the Region), although the regional assembly’s decisions can only be contested by the 
executive on legal grounds before the administrative tribunal (Bergh, 2016, p. 9). The tutelle 
as determined in the 2015 Organic Law is thus tighter than the 2011 constitution had led 
observers to believe.5 In practice, the degree of discretion that a regional president will yield 
over budgetary and planning decisions depends on his or her relationship with the wali and the 
Ministry of the Interior (interview with Ahmed Hadrani, Professor of Law at the University of 
Meknes, on 13 March 2019).
Figure 26.1 illustrates the parallel nature of the Moroccan administration: the ‘deconcen-
trated’ levels of the Ministry of the Interior (called ‘state representatives’) on the one hand, 
who are reporting more or less directly to the King, and the devolved, elected bodies on the 
other. The Moroccan case thus illustrates the argument made earlier – namely, that elaborate 
mechanisms of central supervision and control can largely neutralize decentralization.
The democratic potential of the reform is further limited by the fact that while regional 
council members are now directly elected, their presidents and vice-presidents are only indi-
rectly elected by the regional council members (see Tafra, 2017 for a good overview of the 
regional representatives). As Houdret and Harnisch (2019, p. 950) point out, ‘the system of 
indirect election has led to several negotiations “behind the scenes”, with the result that the 
presidents appointed do not always reflect the majority of the direct electoral votes’. This is 
especially the case with the moderate Islamist ‘Justice and Development Party’ (PJD). While 
it won the 2015 elections, obtaining four times more seats than in 2009, it controls only two 
regions. The political parties agreed to stick to their national-level alliances when voting for 
these regional positions, which means that in some cases the presidents represent parties that 
only have a minority in the council itself, such as the regime-loyal PAM (Authenticity and 
Modernity Party). This probably illustrates the strong influence of the king and his allies in the 
democratic ‘game’ (Wenger, 2015, cited in Houdret and Harnisch, 2019, p. 950). The seat of 
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Figure 26.1 New administrative organization of Morocco since 2015
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president is also financially lucrative: a regional president earns up to MAD50 000 (Moroccan 
dirhams), the same salary as a minister (Ismaili, 2016).
Finally, the Organic Law on the Regions (Law 111-14, Articles 119–122) gives citizens the 
right to launch petitions and to influence the regional council’s agenda. The regional councils 
are obliged to respond to petitioners and to publish the minutes of the council meeting and its 
decision on the eligible petitions. This is expected to build citizens’ trust in their new regional 
governments and to foster a more participatory local development process, also addressing the 
demands of the protest movements who mobilized in 2011 (Bergh, 2016, pp. 9–10, based on 
World Bank, 2015, pp. 25–6; Hoffmann, 2015; interview with World Bank official in Rabat 
on 19 January 2016; interview with faculty member at INAU in Rabat on 21 January 2016). 
However, the exact modalities of citizen engagement outside of petitions (through participa-
tory mechanisms and advisory bodies) are not defined in the Organic Law on the Regions, 
but are left to the regions to define in their internal statutes (Articles 116 and 117; see CESE, 
2016, p. 27). This gives discretion to the regional councillors to name whomever they want in 
these bodies. In practice, this means that on the one hand, the seats in the advisory bodies are 
occupied by people co-opted by the regional council without taking into account the specifi-
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cities of the civil society landscape in the region; on the other hand, often the role of chair of 
these bodies is taken up by the president of the regional assembly himself, further increasing 
his powers and undermining the participatory effect of these bodies (personal communication 
with Francesco Colin, PhD researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam, 2 April 2019).
3.4 Regional Finances
In the area of fiscal decentralization, the intergovernmental transfers to the regions were 
expected to increase ten-fold over ten years to reach MAD10 billion (approximately 900 
million euros) by 2021 (Abou El Farah, 2018). According to the OECD (2018a, p. 19), in the 
2017 budget, regions were going to get 5 per cent of revenue from VAT and corporate tax and 
20 per cent of revenue from tax on insurance contracts, in addition to the other grants from 
the state budget, amounting to a total of MAD5.2 billion. The regional budgets are subject to 
the new legal framework for local governments, which enshrines programmatic budgeting, 
performance management and financial controls, in parallel with the reforms at the national 
level (World Bank, 2015, pp. 25–6). An ‘Inter-regional Solidarity Fund’ has been established 
(though the allocation criteria were only published in December 2015), along with a ‘Social 
Improvement Fund’.
Surprisingly, and contradicting the widespread complaints among civil servants and civil 
society in general that local governments are poor, the OECD (2018a, p. 19) found that ‘funds 
made available to local government by the Treasury remain largely under-used (a total of 
around 33 billion MAD at the end of 2016 including 25.5 billion from previous years and 
almost 7 billion MAD across all subnational government in Morocco according to the latest 
accounts produced by the Treasury in 2017)’. These concern mostly funds allocated to the 
public investment budget, whereas operational expenditure (more than half of which is spent 
on payroll) has been largely spent. The problem is most pronounced at the municipal level: 
65 per cent of these available funds belong to the municipalities, 18 per cent to prefectures 
and provinces and 17 per cent to regions. This is not surprising, as 77 per cent of subnational 
spending was carried out by (mostly urban) municipalities over the 2009–13 period (OECD, 
2018a, pp. 19, 35). This underspending confirms my earlier findings and could be due to a con-
servative spending mentality that associates running deficits with bad management (interview 
with Ahmed Hadrani; and see Bergh, 2017, pp. 145–6 for other probable explanations).
Nevertheless, and compared to the amounts allocated by other government institutions 
(see next section), the regional level faces severe resource constraints. The regions’ incomes 
account for only 16 per cent of all local government income, and the government transfers rep-
resent only 5 per cent of government transfers to all local governments. It is thus not surprising 
that in 2013, the 12 regions only counted a total staff of 378 (CESE, 2016, p. 62, citing the 
National Court of Audit report for 2013).
The human resource capacity constraints may also explain why the regions seem unable to 
spend even the little money that they are getting. They had to carry over their 2016 and 2017 
budgets as they were not able to spend them. In some cases, this is for political reasons (e.g., 
in the region Guelmim-Oued Noun, the coalition supporting the president collapsed, and the 
Ministry of the Interior had to step in). In terms of the implications for political accountability, 
these delays mean that at the next regional elections scheduled for 2021, citizens will have 
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a hard time measuring the impact of these devolved local governments, which will limit the 
possibility of real accountability even further (Tafra, 2018).
3.5 Regional Planning
To properly gauge the potential developmental impact of the newly decentralized structures 
(the regions), it is useful to review the institutional landscape which has emerged over the 
years and which de facto delimits the regional assemblies’ decision space, especially in the 
area of regional planning and investment decisions.
In terms of regional planning, the regional councils who were for the first time directly 
elected in the September 2015 elections, decided on their own 2016 budgets and six-year 
Regional Development Plans (RDPs). To implement these, they were supposed to then agree 
on programming contracts with the Ministry of the Interior and deconcentrated sectoral min-
istries (though not all sectoral ministries have regional offices yet). According to Moroccan 
academic Ahmed Hadrani (interview on 13 March 2019), ten out of the 12 regions had com-
pleted their RDPs by this date. They need to be approved by the Ministry of the Interior before 
they can be implemented (see Article 115 in the Organic Law on the Regions). According to El 
Aissi (2018), the ten RDPs include investment projects worth almost MAD400 billion over six 
years. This amount is obviously far beyond the regions’ means and the Ministry of the Interior 
will therefore have to review all the plans to comply with the regions’ budgets. 
As per the provisions in the 2015 Organic Law, Regional Project Implementation Agencies 
(AREPs) have been established (in all but the region of Marrakech-Safi) under the leadership 
of the president of the regional assembly in order to manage the regional projects and to 
strengthen the implementation capacity of the regional governments. Their budgets are auton-
omous but funded by subsidies from the regional budgets (Bergh, 2016, pp. 9–10; interview 
with Ahmed Hadrani). However, as Houdret and Harnisch (2019, pp. 947–8) point out, in 
three regions, these institutions still compete with the already existing and powerful Regional 
Development Agencies (Agences de Développement Régional), which are used to channel 
important sums to strategically relevant border regions under centralized government control. 
They include the Eastern (Oriental) region (bordering Algeria), the North (including the Rif 
region) and the South (including the Western Sahara). At the time of writing, there was talk 
of shutting them down (see also Boumahrou, 2018 and Walter, 2017). Similarly, since 2002, 
every region has its own Regional Investment Centre (Centres Régionaux d’Investissement – 
CRI) under the leadership of the regional wali. The Court of Audit recently described them 
as ‘empty shells’ and their reform is currently being discussed, but it seems that the wali will 
retain a major role in running them and in coordinating regional investment (Hallaoui, 2018; 
see also the new National Charter on Administrative Deconcentration discussed below).
Another potential source of confusion and overlap are the Regional Spatial Planning 
Schemes (RSPSs) developed since 2009 by the ministry responsible for spatial planning 
issues, the environment, city planning and housing, and which cover a 25-year period to ensure 
the coherence of sectoral strategies (implemented by deconcentrated sectoral ministries’ 
offices; OECD, 2018a, p. 12). Currently, the new regions are responsible for developing and 
updating their Regional Spatial Planning Schemes. As the OECD (2018a, p. 13) points out, 
‘the development and updating of the RSPSs by the regions raises the question [of] aligning 
them with regional development plans and municipal action plans’.
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The backdrop to regional planning is the fact that most public investment is still being done 
by state-owned companies and agencies (Entreprises et Etablissements Publics – EEP), such 
as the Tangiers-Med port project (completed in 2007) or the Noor solar energy project near 
Ouarzazate (completed in 2016; OECD, 2018a, p. 15; OECD, 2018b, p. 241). Local authorities 
(at all three levels) accounted for only 7 per cent of total public investment expenditures in 
2016 (CESE, 2016, p. 63–4).
On top of this, several other development programmes exist that target municipalities, 
provinces and/or regions, such as the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), set 
up in 2005 and currently in its third phase (with a total investment of over MAD37 billion; for 
a critical analysis see Bergh, 2012 and Marei et al., 2018). The National Program on Social 
and Territorial Disparities in Rural Areas is another royal initiative, launched in 2015 and 
implemented by the Ministry of the Interior, which targets 24 290 villages and rural localities 
to benefit from 20 800 projects by 2023. Interestingly, regional councils contribute 40 per cent 
or MAD36 billion  (of a total MAD50 billion budget; OECD, 2018a, pp. 23–4). It is likely 
that this contribution was not decided by the councils themselves, but rather imposed by the 
Ministry of the Interior. Keeping in mind the figures cited above, this also does not seem to 
leave much room for additional spending by the regions on their own priorities.
There is also a host of sector-based strategies with a territorial impact – for example, the 
Green Morocco Plan 2008–2020 (for agricultural development), for which the Ministry of 
Agriculture has developed regional agricultural plans, mostly in partnership with the regional 
walis, with the presidents of the regions taking a back seat. A similar picture emerges for the 
Industrial Acceleration Plan, which includes regional hubs, pilot regions in the 2030 Energy 
Strategy, the Road Strategy 2035, and the National Strategy for Professional Training (see 
OECD, 2018a, pp. 16–17 for a complete listing). As the OECD (2018a, p. 17) rightly observes, 
the implementation of sector-based strategies ‘in the context of advanced regionalization 
raises questions about their different time-horizons, their convergence with the different 
approaches and actions that structure them, the evaluation of their impact on territories and 
their coordination with regional development plans’. A further complicating dynamic is the 
involvement of international donors in supporting both the sectoral strategies as well as the 
‘advanced regionalization’ agenda.6
Interestingly, the region does not have any authority over the provinces and communes – the 
three separate organic laws (deliberately?) leave room for confusion, power struggles, ambigu-
ity and interpretation. As I argued elsewhere (Bergh, 2016, p. 10), this may allow the king to 
play the role of arbiter between various power centres and interests and significantly reduces 
the scope for accountability between levels and towards the citizen. However, the organic 
law specifies that the RDPs will determine the development plans at the other levels. In the 
2015 Organic Law on the Commune, the former ‘Municipal Development Plan’ is now called 
‘Commune Action Plan’, which could imply that the commune’s role is no longer strategic 
but only to execute (regional development) plans (Bergh, 2016, p. 10; see Royaume du Maroc, 
2016 on Organic Law 113-14, Article 78).
While there is no space here to discuss all the regional planning tools and other government 
programmes and examine how they affect the ‘decision space’ of decentralized government 
structures in detail, we can draw two tentative conclusions. First, there is a plethora of terri-
torial planning approaches at the regional level which are near impossible to coordinate in 
an effective way so as to reduce overlaps. Moreover, the status of the RDPs is likely to be 
quite low, compared to the sectoral plans and national programmes. It could also be the case 
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that other priorities not in the RDP become more urgent. For example, in case of drought, 
the region might want to fund subsidies for affected farmers.7 In other words, the RDPs are 
probably only weakly taken into account by government stakeholders, if at all. Second, when 
it comes to fiscal autonomy, the regional council’s budget allocated by the national budget law 
pales in comparison with the amounts invested into local development by other government 
bodies, which are only indirectly within the sphere, or even outside of, the democratic control 
of devolved local governments.8
3.6 The Relationship Between Decentralization and Deconcentration Reforms
Apart from serving as a good example of ‘partial’ or ‘cynical’ decentralization reforms, the 
Moroccan case also illustrates another important point that is not often found in the (academic) 
literature – namely, that without a parallel deconcentration reform, its developmental impacts 
are likely to be limited. Regional (elected) institutions can arguably only create ‘regional 
hubs’, in which public and private investment is channelled in a coordinated way to fund 
priorities that have been jointly identified by state and society representatives, when they can 
directly work with their counterparts in deconcentrated regional directorates of line ministries 
(such as the Ministry of Agriculture, or Public Works). If, on the other hand, every (budgetary) 
decision in these regional directorates depends on prior approval by central-level civil serv-
ants, regional institutions will not be able to play such a coordinating role in an effective way. 
Houdret and Harnisch (2019, p. 948) observe that this imbalance has led to ‘power-struggles, 
bargaining and often opaque decision-making procedures’. This is why deconcentration is 
sometimes called ‘the corollary of successful decentralization’ (OECD, 2018a, p. 40).
A cross-government steering committee was set up in 2014 to set out principles and support 
measures to gradually embed devolved government by encouraging government departments 
to delegate as many of their competences as possible to regional directorates. However, these 
still do not have the necessary autonomy or budgets to make decisions without recourse to 
central government. The long-awaited National Charter on Administrative Deconcentration 
was finally approved and published at the end of 2018 (and in the Bulletin Officiel in French 
on 3 January 2019; Royaume du Maroc, 2019). It has the legal standing of a decree, which 
means that it still needs further implementing laws to apply some of its provisions (interview 
with Ahmed Hadrani).
Its main innovations are that joint regional sectoral offices will be established that will 
be shared by two or more ministerial departments (Article 10), and that their directors will 
have budget-holding powers (as well as hierarchical authority over sectoral offices at the 
province level; Articles 17 and 12, respectively). They can thus conclude contracts with the 
regional institutions. However, it is striking that the regional assemblies as well as the PDRs 
are not mentioned at all in this charter. For example, according to Article 30, the president 
of the regional assembly will not be a member of the new Regional Coordination Committee 
(which will meet at least monthly – Article 32), but rather, it is the wali who is in charge of 
regional convergence (and who gets to set the agenda for the committee meetings). For good 
measure, a new administrative structure called General Secretariat for Regional Affairs will 
be established, headed by a General Secretary for Regional Affairs, appointed by the Minister 
of the Interior and working under the wali’s authority, seemingly without any formal links to 
the elected regional assembly (Article 33). Contrary to the Organic Law on the Region, the 
PDR is not taken as the main reference when it comes to regional planning, but the charter 
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instead refers to ‘Schémas directeurs de la déconcentration administrative’ to be elaborated 
by ‘government authorities’ for each sector (valid for three years), which will define the exact 
responsibilities, financial and human resources, as well as objectives and performance indica-
tors of the deconcentrated regional offices (see Section II of the charter).
From the Moroccan case study, we can thus conclude that, given the complex legal and 
institutional backdrop, the developmental impact of the newly created regions and their assem-
blies is hard to identify. We could even argue that the way in which the advanced regionaliza-
tion reform is being designed constitutes a trap for elected representatives. The strong central 
state involvement in regional planning over which the elected representatives do not have 
much control means that  they will most likely not be able to fulfil their electoral promises, as 
projects will be delayed, or simply not funded (see CESE, 2016, p. 21).
4 CONCLUSIONS
In the first and second sections of this chapter, we reviewed the main promises and risks of 
decentralization reforms. There is a fair amount of wishful thinking evident here, as many of 
the conceptual linkages and theories of change are not actually thought through very well. For 
example, why would devolution be more likely to lead to economic development and stability 
than deconcentration and delegation, given that the latter two ‘may offer greater personnel 
and institutional capacity, opportunities for coordination, economies of scale, and consistent 
enforcement of the rule of law’? (Connerley, Eaton and Smoke 2010, cited in Wunsch, 2014, 
p. 3). Most importantly, we have found substantial evidence for ‘partial’ decentralization to be 
the norm, that is, while the legal framework might give local governments significant auton-
omy and responsibilities, in reality these same local governments are constrained by resource 
constraints, very limited fiscal autonomy, and are used as bases for clientelism. Furthermore, 
the case study on Morocco has served to corroborate the finding by Wunsch (2014) based on 
the in-depth study of ten African countries, that devolution reforms are hardly ever ‘the only 
game in town’, and that they are very often mixed up with elements of deconcentration and 
delegation reforms (Wunsch, 2014, p. 4). I would argue that the precise nature of this mix 
determines whether decentralization reforms can have a positive developmental impact or not.
In line with my earlier argument (Bergh, 2018, p. 3), it could be said that the ‘advanced 
regionalization’ agenda in Morocco represents an exercise in ‘upgrading authoritarianism’ 
(Heydemann, 2007), as it provides new spaces for political competition through elections, 
while at the same time maintaining the power of the makhzen, the power structures surround-
ing the king. This upgrading is achieved through the clever creation and use of legal ambigui-
ties, the launch of a host of competing programmes and planning tools, and the establishment 
of more powerful parallel (deconcentrated, sectoral) institutions. Morocco is not a unique 
case in the region, as Harb and Atallah (2014) point out. Concerned about maintaining their 
power bases, central leaders in many Arab countries at the same time pay lip-service to decen-
tralization policies (as a way of securing donor support and projecting an image of being in a 
‘democratic transition’ phase), while also finding ways to prevent their full implementation. 
Regime elites can thus benefit politically from undertaking decentralization reforms, knowing 
that subnational elections and decentralized revenues generate relatively low risks to their 
power (Dickovick and Beatty Riedl, 2014, p. 254).
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It seems that even the World Bank, one of the main proponents of decentralization reforms 
around the world over the past 30 years, is now recognizing that the main drivers for such 
reforms are political rather than a desire to bring government closer to the people as part of 
benevolent ‘good governance’ reforms. In what I believe reflects a major change in institu-
tional thinking, the World Development Report 2017 (World Bank, 2017, p. 219) states that 
‘decisions to decentralize (or recentralize) are primarily politically motivated and involve 
bargains among multiple stakeholders in which technocratic criteria often take a back seat. 
Outcomes reflect the relative bargaining powers of competing interests, mediated by the 
existing political institutions’.
To sum up, this chapter aims to contribute to this Handbook by reviewing – at least a part of 
– the vast literature on decentralization, its definitions, drivers, promises and risks. With regard 
to the linkages with local development, the chapter explains the dearth of conclusive evidence 
by referring to the paradox of decentralization, that is, the notion that it often strengthens the 
position of national-level actors, while not bringing about many changes in local governance.
In terms of a future research agenda, I suggest that while political decentralization (or 
devolution) reforms provide a fertile ground for researching state–society relations, we are 
better advised to turn our gaze to deconcentration and delegation reforms (in which much 
more substantive resources are decentralized to non-elected offices, and which include local 
public–private partnerships), if we want to understand how local development comes about.
NOTES
1. This definition is based on the ideas of key thinkers in fiscal federalism: Richard Musgrave 
(Musgrave, 1959; Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973), Mancur Olson (1969), Dennis Rondinelli (1982) 
and Wallace Oates (1972).
2. However, as Boex and Yilmaz (2010, p. 2) observe, during the 1990s and under the so-called 
Washington Consensus, ‘major decentralization reforms were often pursued (implicitly or explic-
itly) with the purpose of reducing the size of the (central) public sector’.
3. This section is mostly based on Bergh (2016) and Bergh (2018); see also Ojeda García and Suárez 
Collado (2015) for an excellent account of the advanced regionalization reform as proposed by the 
Commission consultative de la régionalisation Royaume du Maroc (CCR) (2011).
4. See Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Direction des Etudes et des Prévisions Financières 
(DEPF) (2015) for an innovative study by the Ministry of Finance that mapped these inequalities 
through the lens of access to human rights.
5. See Article 145 of the 2011 constitution, which only says that the walis and provincial governors 
ensure the application of the law, implement governmental regulations and decisions, and exercise 
an administrative control, which seems to point to a posteriori tutelle, whereas the Organic Law of 
2015 includes many more a priori tutelle provisions.
6. I thank Daniele Rossi Doria (PhD researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus 
University Rotterdam) for this point, which, however, lies outside the scope of this chapter (but see 
also Bergh, 2016).
7. I thank Ahmed Hadrani for this point.
8. Even at the national level, not all public expenditures are approved by parliament, and budget trans-
parency is very low. According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018, p. 12), ‘the 2015 Open Budget 
Survey, which provides a score of how transparent public budgets are in various countries, awards 
Morocco a classification of “minimal” transparency, the second worst classification after “scant or 
none.” Morocco has been continuously in this classification since 2008’.
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